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1 
1 Introduction
From the end of the Second World War until the early 80’s, labor unions in Northern
European countries combined into a unions’ federation which was mandated to meet with
the employers’ association and negotiate wages nationwide. This wage-setting arrange-
ment reached its maximum strength in the heavily unionized Scandinavian economies
—Denmark, Finland and Sweden— and has been referred to as the Scandinavian model
or the centralized wage-bargaining model. Existing quantitative measures of centraliza-
tion in wage-bargaining show that this arrangement began to collapse in the early 80’s,
and that it went on declining at least until the mid 90’s. Furthermore, the chronology of
events in Sweden supports the hypothesis that the collapse of centralized bargaining was
the result of a breakdown in the unions’ alliance [see e.g. Freeman and Gibbons (1995)].
In view of these facts we construct a macroeconomic model intended to provide answers
to the following questions: Why did labor unions choose to form a federation and engage
in centralized wage negotiations in the first place? What made labor unions change their
strategies and undertake their own wage negotiations, abandoning an arrangement that
had proved useful for 30 years?
Previous literature (we review key contributions in the next section) has made clear
that centralization was brought about by the need to avoid potential negative externalities
that could arise from a decentralized wage-setting process in highly unionized economies.
In this paper, we put forth the novel idea that the main externality is a fiscal one, and
assess, with the help of a simple equilibrium model, whether such externality can indeed
lead to the establishment of centralized negotiations. Our model explains the collapse of
centralization in terms of technological change, which is explicitly modeled using recent
empirical evidence. The model we present abstracts from a number of institutions an
historical developments that might have played an important role in the determination of
the wage-setting process. Hence, this paper intends neither to challenge previous theories
nor to offer a revisionist view of modern Scandinavian economic history. Our aim is simply
to introduce, and assess, a new hypothesis in the debate on the rise and fall of centralized
wage bargaining.
Even though the model we propose is rather stylized, especially concerning issues non-
central to our arguments, it captures well the main tensions we think shape the feedback
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from public insurance and technology to the wage-bargaining arrangement, a feedback that
will help us explain the rise and fall of centralization. The main ingredients of our theory
are: government-funded, union-administered unemployment benefits, progressive direct
taxation, and technological progress. Both the setup of centralization and its collapse can
be accounted for in terms of the interplay of fiscal and technological links among different
types of workers. Fiscal links are created by the unemployment benefits program, and
technological links by the production process.
Our modeling of the ingredients mentioned above, and their role in shaping the links
among workers, is the following. Union-administered unemployment benefits (Ghent sys-
tem) leads to high unionization rates.1 Hence, we will assume full unionization. The
unions’ role is to disburse benefits and negotiate wages in order to maximize the affiliated
worker’s net income. Under government-funded benefits, when a union negotiates in a
decentralized manner it imposes an externality on other unions, as it transfers part of the
burden of financing benefits for its own unemployed to the rest of the economy. That is,
a worker’s net income depends not only on the wage his union negotiates, but also on
the wages negotiated by all other unions in the economy. This creates fiscal and benefit
externalities among unions when negotiation is decentralized.
Workers are also linked by the production process, and technical change shapes the
nature of that link. Our modeling of the production process and its evolution during
the postwar period is based on Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997). Technological
progress is investment specific, as it is embodied in new capital equipment (i.e., in order
to realize the benefits of technological progress firms must invest in new equipment). Fol-
lowing this approach to technological progress Krusell, Ohanian, R´ıos-Rull and Violante
(2000) and Lindquist (2005) estimate an aggregate production function for the U.S. and
the Swedish economies, respectively. They find evidence for the existence of equipment-
skill complementarity. The combination of equipment-specific technical progress and
equipment-skill complementarity yields an increase in the spread of labor productivity
across workers.
In a calibrated version of our model, we show that the interplay of the two linkages
1Unionization rates in countries with a Ghent system, like Sweden, are above 90%, and, contrary to
the US, the UK and other continental European countries have not shown a tendency to decline. (See
Clasen and Viebrock (2008) for a study of labor union membership and the Ghent system.)
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—fiscal and technological— can account both for the initial setup of centralized wage bar-
gaining and for its subsequent collapse. The intuition for this result can be outlined as
follows. Under the pre-80’s production technology, with expensive and scarce capital equip-
ment, high-skilled and low-skilled workers are productivity-wise fairly close. Therefore, the
fiscal externalities created by the program of unemployment benefits when bargaining is
decentralized open a route to multiple equilibria and hence to coordination failures. Since
coordination failures can impinge upon unions’ income, there are systems of expectations
that support centralized bargaining as an equilibrium of the pre-80’s economy. Thus, ac-
cording to our theory, the rise of centralization was a response to the need to internalize
the fiscal spillovers of wage bargaining. The basic principle underlying this result is that
a generous and progressive system of public insurance may be a source of macroeconomic
instability, which induces economic agents —labor unions in this case— to respond by
creating new institutions in order to mitigate the implied volatility on their income levels.
The fall of centralization can be understood as the result of technological progress,
which brings down the price of equipment and, holding fiscal variables fixed, increases
the productivity gap across skills. This increase in productivity heterogeneity among
workers removes the possibility of coordination failures, and, consequently, the existence
of rational expectations supporting centralized bargaining.2 Our explanation for the fall of
centralization abstracts thus from issues of wage solidarity, and/or changes in the relative
strength of different workers within the union federation. Our analysis is also silent on
the relationship between the wage-setting arrangement and industry sectoral composition.
[For an analysis of the effects of centralized bargaining on the industry distribution of
employment see Davis and Henrekson (2005).]
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief review of the related
literature. In Section 3 we discuss some evidence of the rise and fall of centralization, and
review some institutional features of the Scandinavian benefits program. In Section 4 we
present the model and define the equilibrium. In Section 5 we parameterize and calibrate
the model, and present our main results. Section 6 draws the main conclusions.
2The role of heterogeneity in eliminating equilibrium multiplicity, and thus the possibility of coordina-
tion failures, has been amply established in the literature [see e.g. Morris and Shin (2003)].
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2 Related Literature
Empirical work on the relationship between wage bargaining arrangements and macroe-
conomic performance has shown the importance of the wage-setting process in determining
aggregate economic variables. A first strand of this literature has focused on ascertaining
the effects on unemployment rates [see, e.g., Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and Daveri
and Tabellini (2000)]. These studies have found, using panel data for the OECD coun-
tries, that highly centralized wage bargaining leads to lower unemployment. These results
have led many authors to believe that Scandinavian countries were able to maintain low
levels of unemployment in the 70’s —while other European countries started to see their
unemployment rates climb to two-digit figures— because of their highly centralized wage-
bargaining arrangements. A second strand of the literature has focused on the relationship
between centralization and competitiveness [see, e.g., Alesina and Perotti (1997) and Sum-
mers, Gruber and Vergara (1993)]. These studies have found that the effects of increases
in labor taxes on labor costs are lower in countries with highly centralized labor mar-
kets than in countries with intermediate levels of centralization. These results have led
to the conclusion that centralization has helped Scandinavian countries to improve their
international competitiveness.
Most explanations of the rise and fall of centralized bargaining, including this paper,
share a common basic idea: decentralized wage bargaining imposes some type of exter-
nality, which, in fully unionized economies, can be internalized through centralized wage
bargaining. When the gains from such an internalization are positive, centralization will
emerge as the wage-setting arrangement, otherwise decentralization will prevail.
In a pioneering and influential paper, Calmfors and Driffill (1988) put forward the idea
of price inflation externalities in the process of wage setting —i.e., claims for nominal wage
increases by one union bring higher prices for the whole economy. These authors study
the relationship between the centralization of wage bargaining and macroeconomic per-
formance, and find the, by now well-known, hump-shaped relation between centralization
and unemployment. Building upon the Calmfors and Driffill price inflation externality, a
number of papers [e.g., Cukierman and Lippi (1999, 2001), Iversen (1998), Soskice and
Iversen (1998) and Velasco and Guzzo (1999)] added to the model a role for monetary pol-
icy by introducing a central bank. The explanations for the rise and fall of centralization
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that seem to emerge from this literature depend on the goal assigned to central banks,
either as inflation or unemployment fighters.
On the one hand, if the goal of the national central bank is to control national in-
flation, it will adopt non-accommodating, restrictive monetary policies as a response to
unions’ claims for higher nominal wages. When such a central bank is sovereign in setting
monetary policy, centralized wage bargaining is a means for labor unions to anticipate the
central bank’s response to wage increases and, therefore, centralization may arise as the
desirable wage-setting arrangement. With the advent of the European Monetary Union,
national central banks lost part of their independence to set monetary policy in favor of
the European Central Bank, whose target is European inflation. Consequently, national
centralized bargaining becomes an invalid means to internalize the interest rate effects of
union wage claims, thus explaining its collapse.
On the other hand, if the goal of the national central bank is unemployment, it will
adopt accommodating, inflationary monetary policies as a response to higher nominal
wages. The collapse of centralization in this case is explained as a consequence of global-
ization: increased international capital mobility hinders the use of inflationary monetary
policies, and thus reduces the anticipatory gains of centralized bargaining. As an ex-
planation for the rise and fall of centralization, this inflation externality mechanism has
been subject to criticism. Bleaney (1996) concludes that there is no evidence of a causal
relationship between monetary policy and centralization.
Our paper is also related to Freeman and Gibbons (1995). We depart from these
authors in two important respects. First, contrary to our fiscal externality, these authors
see the threat of price inflation as the main reason for centralization. Regarding its collapse,
they point out two main reasons, “a reduction in the importance of controlling inflation
through centralized negotiations”, and, second, “the more heterogenous the groups covered
by the central agreement, the more likely some groups will [...] consider a defect strategy.”
In their framework the meaning of heterogeneity is, however, vague, and it is modeled
as a shift parameter known to firms and unions, but unknown to the central federation.
They interpret this parameter as a productivity or price shock. We depart by modeling
technological progress explicitly. We use recent evidence on the extent of equipment-
specific technical change and on equipment-skill complementarities. Another difference
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with respect to Freeman and Gibbons (1995) is that we view the cost of centralization
as a distributional one, arising from the tension between high- and low-skilled workers,
instead of the inefficiency costs arising from asymmetric information as postulated by these
authors. Even though our framework is different from theirs, both in the modeling of the
labor market, and in the role played by labor unions and their union federation, some
implications are, however, similar.
Our analysis shares important similarities with Acemoglu, Aghion and Violante (2001).
These authors abstract from issues related to the centralization of wage bargaining, and
focus on the decline in unionization rates in the US and the UK. They argue that skill-
biased technical change causes deunionization because it increases the relative productivity
of high-skilled workers, and, hence, weakens their incentives to remain in a union that
compresses wages.
Alexopoulos and Cohen (2003) depart from the internalization argument outlined above
and propose an explanation for the rise and fall of centralization based on a reallocation
hypothesis. These authors argue that centralization was a means to help increase the
supply of labor to the growing, export-oriented firms. They point to a decrease in inter-
union solidarity as the main cause of the collapse in centralization.
Finally, our work is also related to the work of Delacroix (2006). This author stud-
ies the contribution of institutional differences (union presence, collective bargaining and
centralization) to the differential in unemployment between Europe and the U.S. With
this aim, the author presents a model where these institutions are exogenous and can be
varied so that their impact on the unemployment rate can be assessed quantitatively. It
is found that unemployment increases with collective bargaining coverage and decreases
with centralization.
3 Some Evidence on The Rise and Fall of Centralization
The rise and fall of centralized wage bargaining has been extensively reported in the
literature [see Lundberg (1985) for an early contribution]. In more recent years, the
construction of indexes of centralization has shed new light on issues such as the cross-
country disparity in centralization, and its decline in countries where centralization was
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the long-standing wage-setting arrangement.
In order to show that the decline in centralization did actually imply a loss of ability to
internalize macroeconomic constraints –i.e., that it was not compensated by other forms
of coordination,– we also present indexes of coordination in wage bargaining, as centrali-
zation and coordination in wage bargaining are not equivalent concepts. Centralization
describes the locus of the formal structure of wage bargaining. Typically, three broad
levels are distinguished: national, industry and firm-level bargaining. Coordination refers
instead to the degree of consensus between bargaining partners, or in other words, to the
degree of intentional harmonization in the wage-setting process. Coordination can thus
be the result of communication and guidance between bargaining units without calling
for the centralization of negotiations. The evidence presented in this section shows an
unambiguous tendency towards less centralization and less coordination, especially in those
countries with high initial levels in both.
The most widely used index of centralization in wage bargaining is the one constructed
by Iversen (1999). His index ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 corresponds to full centralization.
The index combines a measure of the level of bargaining (centralized, intermediate and
decentralized) with a measure of union concentration. The index also takes into account
the degree of enforceability of wage agreements, that is the ability of lower-level bargainers
to elude the agreement. The index covers 15 OECD countries from 1973 to 1993. Table
1 below presents the evolution of centralization for the three countries with the highest
centralization scores in the early 70’s: Denmark, Finland and Sweden. During the twenty-
year period 1973-1993, centralization in these countries declined by almost a 50%. Other
countries3 with moderate levels of centralization in the 70’s also experienced a significant
falloff during the same period; an example is the UK, whose centralization scores are
shown in Table 1. Finally, and in order to help assess the extent of centralization in these
European countries in the early 70’s, we also present the index for the US.
3Among these countries are Austria, Belgium and Germany.
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TABLE 1—AN INDEX OF CENTRALIZATION IN WAGE BARGAINING
1973-79 1980-86 1987-93
Denmark 0.62 0.42 0.33
Finland 0.47 0.4 0.35
Sweden 0.6 0.5 0.35
United Kingdom 0.26 0.12 0.12
United States 0.07 0.07 0.07
Source: Iversen (1999)
Kenworthy (2001) presents an index of coordination in wage bargaining. Besides formal
bargaining centralization, the index considers other ways of achieving coordination such as
informal centralization and pattern-setting. The index distinguishes 5 categories, ordered
by their increasing level of coordination: 1 corresponds to fragmented wage bargaining
confined to individual firms or plants, and 5 corresponds to centralized bargaining by
peak confederations with perfect enforceability. Table 2 presents this coordination index.
TABLE 2—AN INDEX OF COORDINATION IN WAGE BARGAINING
1973-79 1980-86 1987-93
Denmark 5 3.85 3
Finland 4 3.6 3.25
Sweden 5 4 3.4
United Kingdom 4 1 1
United States 1.5 1 1
Source: Kenworthy (2001).
A combined index of centralization and coordination in wage bargaining is presented
in Calmfors (2001) [the index is based on work by Visser (2000)]. This index includes
measures of the level of negotiation, and of the share of union members organized by the
federation. The index presents averages for the periods 1973-77, 1983-87 and 1993-97.
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TABLE 3—A COMBINED INDEX OF CENTRALIZATION AND COORDINATION
1973-77 1983-87 1993-97
Denmark 0.64 0.47 0.34
Finland 0.64 0.58 0.47
Sweden 0.75 0.49 0.39
United Kingdom 0.37 0.18 0.14
Source: Calmfors (2001). Information for the US is not reported.
We find it convenient to review some events of the first postwar years which marked
the rise of centralization. We restrict our attention here to the case of Sweden, since
other countries where centralization was high, e.g. Denmark and Finland, present striking
similarities with the Swedish case. We briefly describe the main building blocks of the
Swedish unemployment program, and then argue that some of the features of this program
played a key role in the rise of centralized wage negotiations.
Among all the policies adopted in the first years of the postwar period, those related
to fiscal and social issues were at the forefront. Indeed, the construction of the welfare
state was unarguably the flagship of the so-called Swedish model. These policies built on
two main pillars: highly progressive direct taxation, and enlargement of social insurance
programs. The latter included a generous system of union-administered, progressive un-
employment benefits financed by the government, known as the Ghent system. In Sweden,
cash benefits for the unemployed are disbursed by forty societies that administer unem-
ployment funds. Each society is ordinarily affiliated with one or more labor unions. To
apply for income-related unemployment benefits from a society, a worker must be affili-
ated with a union for at least one year before becoming unemployed. Therefore, and not
surprisingly, in countries with a Ghent system (Sweden, Denmark, Finland) unionization
rates climbed and remained at rates in the order of 90%. Funds for the unemployment
benefits program are provided by the government using a pay-as-you-go financing system.
Labor unions’ contribution is purely symbolic amounting only to an average of six percent
of the whole program. With pay-as-you-go financing, tax rates on factor incomes are set
such that current tax revenues equal current benefits.4
4In the late 1990’s Scandinavian economies started a debate on reforming the financing of unemploy-
ment benefits. In Finland, buffer funding of unemployment benefits was discussed. Contributions to the
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Within the context of this institutional arrangement, Swedish unions’ and employers’
federations held the first centralized wage negotiations in the early fifties.5 Centralization
went on almost uninterruptedly until the early 80’s. We argue in this paper that two
features of the Ghent system, namely, the workers’ affiliation requirement and the public,
pay-as-you-go funding of benefits, set necessary conditions for the centralization of wage
bargaining. The first by leading to full unionization, and the second by creating fiscal
externalities among labor unions under decentralized wage bargaining.
By the time Scandinavian economies were implementing a Ghent program of unem-
ployment benefits, the UK and most non-Scandinavian European countries had already
abandoned the Ghent system to adopt compulsory ones. In compulsory systems unem-
ployment benefits are government-administered. Workers collect payments directly from
the government without conditioning on affiliation with a labor union. As a result, union-
ization rates in non-Scandinavian economies hardly ever reached 50%.
4 The Model
In this section we present a model of frictional unemployment and define the equilibrium
under different levels of centralization in wage bargaining. We consider an economy with
two types of workers: high-skilled (s) and low-skilled (u). Since our emphasis here is on the
externalities generated by the financing of unemployment benefits, and on the production
process, we abstract from other labor market externalities by assuming perfectly segmented
labor markets. That is, high- and low-skilled workers do not congest each other when
searching for a job. If we denote by hj,t the number of workers of type j searching for a
job at time t, and by vj,t the number of vacancies open for type-j workers at time t, for
j = s, u, then, the total number of matches is given by
Mj,t =M(vj,t, hj,t), (4.1)
unemployment program could exceed outlays in some periods and thus the buffer stock would be created.
In Sweden, the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations, SACO, (a federation of labor unions
for high-skilled workers), made a proposal to run its own benefits program, which, ultimately, amounts
to a proposal to untie unemployment contributions from general taxation and thus to remove fiscal links
among unions.
5Actually, unions’ and employers’ federations had already met in 1938, but only to reach agreements
concerning procedures for settling disputes and work safety.
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where M(·, ·) has the standard properties of a matching function, i.e., it is increasing in
the number of vacancies, vj, and searchers, hj, is concave in both arguments and linearly
homogeneous.
Unions There is a continuum of workers of measure one. Let xj denote the measure of
workers of type j, for j = s, u. Since unemployment benefits are union-administered, we
can assume that all workers are affiliated with labor unions. Unions are risk neutral, and
workers choose the union according to their type. There are Nj unions of workers of type j.
A worker can be in one of the following three situations: 1) employed (e), 2) unemployed
and entitled to unemployment benefits (ub), or 3) unemployed and not entitled to benefits,
in which case the worker enters the welfare program (uw). The number of hours worked by
an employed worker is fixed and normalized to one. Thus, an employed union member’s
net income at time t is yej,t = ωj,t−τt(ωj,t−d), where ωj,t is the wage rate, τt is the tax rate,
and d > 0 is a personal deduction. The personal deduction is included in order to introduce
progressivity in the tax scheme. An unemployed union member’s net income, if entitled
to unemployment benefits, is yubj,t = Φt(ωj,t + ς)− τt[Φt(ωj,t + ς)− d], where Φt and ς ≥ 0
determine the generosity and progressivity of the unemployment benefit program. ς is a
parameter that pins down the progressivity of benefits; for ς = 0 the entitled unemployed
receives a proportion Φt of the wage rate. If the unemployed worker is not entitled to
unemployment benefits, he will receive a lump sum B > 0 from the welfare program,
which leaves the net income of unemployed workers on welfare at yuwt = B − τt(B − d).
(We are implicitly assuming that the unemployed’s gross income, either on benefits or
welfare, is at least as large as d.)
The transition from unemployment to employment and vice versa is as follows. At the
end of a period all jobs are destroyed. At the beginning of the next period all workers
search for a job at the cost κ > 0. Those who are matched with a vacancy, and affiliated
with a union whose wage bargaining ended in agreement, become employed. Remaining
workers become unemployed.
Hence, the expected pre-matching after-tax income of a typical union worker of type
j is given by,
yj,t = mj,ty
e
j,t + (1−mj,t)[(1− ψ)yubj,t + ψyuw] for j = s, u, (4.2)
where mj,t denotes the matching rate for workers of type j; ψ is the rate that governs
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eligibility for unemployment benefits. That is, ψ is the exit rate from the unemployment
benefit program. Thus, conditional on remaining unemployed, an average unemployed
worker receives unemployment benefits for 1/ψ periods. In order to simplify notation we
will use φt to denote the product Φt(1− ψ) whenever we find it convenient.
A typical union of type-j workers will choose to hold centralized wage negotiations
whenever it yields a higher yj,t than under decentralized bargaining. The analysis of wage
determination under each of these two bargaining arrangements is presented below.
Firms There is a continuum of firms producing an aggregate homogeneous good. The
technology is constant returns to scale in high- and low-skilled labor, capital structures,
kst, and capital equipment, keq. The assumption of constant returns to scale renders
constant capital-employment and vacancies-employment ratios across firms. Thus, we can
write the maximization problem of a representative firm as,
pit = max
vs,t,vu,t,kst,t,keq,t
F (kst,t, keq,t, ns,t, nu,t)− ∑
j=s,u
[ωj,tnj,t + aj(vj,t)]−
∑
i=st,eq
ri,tki,t
 .
(4.3)
Employment levels are given by nj,t = µj,tvj,t, for j = s, u, where µj,t denotes the matching
rate for a vacancy of type j, which is taken as given by the firm when choosing the
number of vacancies; rst,t and req,t denote the rental prices of structures and equipment,
respectively; and aj(vj,t) is a convex vacancy cost function whose particular functional
form is presented below. So far, we only impose that F satisfies the standard assumptions
of concavity, differentiability and homogeneity of degree one. Further assumptions on the
elasticities of substitution between equipment and each type of labor will be imposed in
Section 5.
The timing of actions within a time period is: firms open vacancies, then wages are
negotiated and capital is rented. Hence, as will become clearer in the next subsections,
the problem of the individual firm depends critically on whether wage bargaining is de-
centralized or centralized. In the former scenario the firm is in charge of its own wage
negotiations, and, therefore, it does not take wage rates as given when opening vacancies,
but it anticipates the effects of its own hiring on negotiated wages. Thus, in problem
(4.3), the firm correctly anticipates wage functions ωj(ns,t, nu,t), for j = s, u. This is an
application of so-called intra-firm bargaining, first proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996),
and then used by Cahuc and Wasmer (2001), Cahuc, Marque and Wasmer (2008) and
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Rotemberg (2006), among others, within the framework of search-and-matching models.6
On the other hand, when bargaining is centralized, the individual firm takes wages as
given as these will be negotiated by the employers’ federation.
Capital stocks can be adjusted at no cost. Firms’ capital demands are obtained by
equating rental prices to the respective marginal productivities,
Fki,t = ri,t for i = st, eq, (4.4)
where Fkst,t and Fkeq,t denote the derivatives of the production function with respect to
kst,t and keq,t, respectively.
Capitalists The owners of capital (structures and equipment) and the firms are called
capitalists. We also assume that they are risk neutral, and their only decision is to split
current income between consumption and investment. Their objective is to maximize
discounted lifetime consumption of the aggregate good. Capitalists’ income is made up of
capital income and firms’ profits. Factor incomes are subject to taxation at the rate τt,
net of the personal deduction d. Thus, capitalists’ time-t consumption, ct, is determined
by the budget constraint,
ct + ist,t + ieq,t = (1− τt)[rst,tkst,t + req,tkeq,t] + τtd+ pit, (4.5)
where ist,t and ieq,t denote gross investment in structures and equipment, respectively, and
pit denotes firms’ profits. Structures depreciate at the rate δst, and equipment at the rate
δeq. Our assumption of equipment-specific technical change implies that one unit of the
aggregate good invested in equipment increases its stock by q units. That is, the law of
motion for capital equipment is,
keq,t+1 = (1− δeq)keq,t + ieq,tq. (4.6)
On the contrary, one unit of the aggregate good invested in structures increases its stock by
one unit. Thus, factor q represents the level of technology for producing capital equipment,
and an increase in q is interpreted as equipment-specific technical progress. This particular
modeling was first proposed by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997) in order to assess
6It should be noted that the Stole-Zwiebel’s effect is not key for our results below. In an early version of
our paper we solved the decentralized bargaining problem abstracting entirely from this effect and found
the same qualitative results.
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the role of sector-specific technical change in generating postwar U.S. growth. Since 1/q is
the relative price of equipment, the rate of equipment-specific technological progress can
be derived from the price series. It has been widely reported that q increased during the
postwar period in most industrialized countries. For example, in the U.S. economy the
average annual rate of increase during the postwar period is well above 3%. Here, we will
focus our attention on two dates and, therefore, will consider two different values for q.
Under the assumptions stated above it is straightforward to show that the optimal
investment policy for the capitalists calls for,
(1− τt)rst,t − δst = (1− τt)qreq,t − δeq = 1
β
− 1, (4.7)
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor.
The Unemployment Benefits and Welfare Program Unemployment funding, includ-
ing unemployment benefits and welfare, is provided by the government, which is assumed
to balance the program’s budget every period. Under these assumptions we can write the
unemployment program’s budget constraint as,
τtTt = (1− ψ)
∑
j=s,u
(xj − nj,t)Φt(ωj,t + ς) + ψ
∑
j=s,u
(xj − nj,t)B (4.8)
where Tt denotes the tax base and is given by,
Tt =
∑
j=s,u
(
nj,t(ωj,t − d) + (1− ψ)(xj − nj,t)(Φt(ωj,t + ς)− d) + ψ(xj − nj,t)(B − d)
)
+
+
∑
i=st,eq
ri,tki,t − d.
The right-hand side of equation (4.8) represents total outlays of the program, namely,
unemployment benefits to all entitled unemployed workers plus welfare payments to those
not entitled to benefits. The public financing of unemployment benefits and welfare, along
with the assumption of a balanced budget, implies that the tax rate is an endogenous
variable which depends on the wage rates and employment levels prevailing in the whole
economy.
Unemployment benefits are set by the government after wages have been bargained.
We think of the government as using unemployment benefits to redistribute income. Gov-
ernment’s preferences are represented by a generalized utilitarian social welfare function
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over net incomes of all agents in the economy: capitalists, employed workers, unemployed
workers on benefits and the unemployed on welfare. Thus, subject to (4.8), the government
sets Φt in order to maximize
SW =
(yct )γ + ∑
j=s,u
nj,t(y
e
j,t)
γ + (1− ψ)(xj − nj,t)(yubj,t)γ + ψ(xj − nj,t)(yuw)γ
 1γ (4.9)
where yct denotes capitalists’ net income, and γ ≤ 1 determines the government’s attitude
towards inequality, with γ = 1 corresponding to an inequality-insensitive government.
When bargaining is centralized, employers’ and unions’ federations anticipate the effects of
wages on both unemployment benefits, Φt, and taxes, τt. When bargaining is decentralized,
individual unions and firms take both policy variables as given.
The next subsections present the equilibrium under decentralized and centralized bar-
gaining. For notational convenience we will drop the time subscript for the remaining of
the paper. Our assumptions imply that the model has no transitional dynamics.
4.1 The Decentralized Bargaining Equilibrium
In this subsection we characterize the decentralized bargaining equilibrium. As was
explained above, when opening vacancies firms anticipate the effects of hiring on wages.
Thus, first-order conditions for vacancies are,[
Fnj − ωj −
∂ωs
∂nj
(ns, nu,)ns, − ∂ωu
∂nj
(ns, nu)nu
]
µj = a
′
j(vj) for j = s, u, (4.10)
where Fnj denotes the derivative of the production function with respect to nj; ∂ωl/∂nj
denotes the partial derivative of the wage for workers of type l with respect to the firm’s
employment level of workers of type j; and a′j(vj) is the derivative of the vacancy cost
function. These first-order conditions establish that the marginal cost of a vacancy equals
its marginal return. It becomes clear from equation (4.10) that when assessing the return
of a new vacancy of type j the firm weighs the effects of hiring on wages, as captured by
the last two terms inside the square brackets.
The decentralized wage negotiations that take place after matching proceed as follows.
A union is assumed to engage in wage bargaining on behalf of its affiliated workers with
the firm they were matched with. We denote by zij the number of workers matched with
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the firm that are affiliated with union i of type-j workers. As in Rotemberg (2006),
we adopt the simplifying assumption that unions negotiate simultaneously, each with a
separate representative of the firm. Furthermore, bargaining pairs assume, at the time of
bargaining, that the firm will reach agreements with all other unions. That is, the firm
representative negotiating with union i of type-j workers fails to see the consequences on
other unions’ wages of not reaching an agreement. On the other hand, unions bargain
without coordinating wage claims, and taking policy variables —taxes and benefits— as
given.
We follow the literature on search and matching and assume that wages are the solution
to Nash-bargaining problems. Income values of agreement to unions and firms are as
follows. The net income value to a union i of type j of having zij workers employed at the
wage ωj, is,
W ij − U ij = zij
[
ωj − τ(ωj − d)
]
− zij
[
(1− ψ)
(
Φ(ωj + ς)− τ(Φ(ωj + ς)− d)
)
+
+ψ
(
B − τ(B − d)
) ]
, (4.11)
which is the difference between net income from employment —the first expression on the
right-hand side— and net income from the union’s outside option, unemployment —the
second expression on the right-hand side.
For a firm, the net income value of employing zij workers at wage ωj, anticipating that
all other remaining workers matched with the firm will be employed, is,
J ij = F − F−z
i
j − ωjzij − (kst − k
−zij
st )rst − (keq − k
−zij
eq )req (4.12)
where F denotes firm’s production when all matched workers are employed; F−z
i
j is firm’s
production when all but the zij workers affiliated with union i are employed; likewise
k
−zij
st and k
−zij
eq denote, respectively, firm’s demand for structures and equipment in case of
disagreement with union i.
Union i’s wages are hence given by,
ωij = argmaxωj (W
i
j − U ij)p(J ij)1−p, (4.13)
where p denotes the bargaining power of the union. The first-order condition to this
maximization problem is (1 − p)(W ij − U ij)J ′ij + pJ ij(W ′ij − U ′ij ) = 0, where J ′ij , W ′ij , and
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U ′ij denote the corresponding derivatives with respect to ωj. Using the above values of
employment for the union and the firm, and the first-order condition to maximization
problem (4.13), we can derive the wage to union i’s workers as a function of the firm’s
employment levels,
ωij(ns, nu) = p
F − F−zij − (kst − k−zijst )rst − (keq − k−zijeq )req
zij
+ (1− p)φς + ψB
1− φ . (4.14)
We will focus on symmetric equilibria in which all unions within each skill group have
the same size, i.e., zij = nj/Nj.
Definition A decentralized bargaining equilibrium (DBE) is a set of sequences for rental
prices of capitals, {rst, req}, employment levels, {ns, nu}, capital stocks {kst, keq}, vacancies
{vs, vu}, matching rates for vacancies {µs, µu}, matching rates for workers {ms,mu}, the
tax rate {τ}, unemployment benefits, {Φ}, and a pair of wage functions ωs(ns, nu) and
ωu(ns, nu), such that,
(i) Taking rental prices, wage functions and matching rates as given, {kst, keq}, and
{vs, vu} solve the firms’ maximization problem, and nj = µjvj, for j = s, u.
(ii) Taking tax rates and rental prices as given, {kst, keq} maximize capitalists’ lifetime
utility.
(iii) Taking unemployment benefits as given, wage functions are the Nash solution to
uncoordinated bargaining problems.
(iv) Matching rates are given by the matching function, i.e., µj = Mj/vj, and mj =
Mj/xj, for j = s, u.
(v) {Φ} solves the government’s maximization problem, and the budget constraint of
the unemployment benefit program holds.
(vi) The following participation constraints are satisfied: workers’ pre-matching net in-
comes are at least as high as search costs, i.e., yj ≥ κ, for j = s, u.
The possibility of multiple equilibria stems from the externalities generated by the
unemployment benefits program. From the two wage equations (4.14), it is clear that
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the wage rate for a union-j’s worker depends on benefits. Since policy variables are
determined in equilibrium by all wages bargained in the economy, there is room for multiple
expectational equilibria. Thus, there may be multiple values for τt and Φt such that when
they are expected to prevail in equilibrium by all unions and firms, they also solve the
government’s maximization problem at the wages satisfying (4.14).7 It is also evident
from (4.14) that the multiplicity of decentralized equilibria depends crucially on two main
factors. First, the strength of the fiscal externalities –i.e., the extent to which fiscal and
benefit variables affect negotiated wages. The last term in the wage equations shows
that the generosity and progressivity of unemployment benefits, welfare payments and
the eligibility to benefits are key determinants of the fiscal externalities. Second, the
productivity gap across workers, as captured by F − F−zij for j = s, u, in the first terms
of the wage equations.
4.2 The Centralized Bargaining Equilibrium
Under centralized, national wage bargaining, all workers, both high- and low-skilled,
employed and unemployed, are represented in a single bargaining table. Wages to all
matched workers are set simultaneously, taking into account the effects on both taxes and
unemployment benefits.8
7The existence of multiple equilibria under a balanced-budget rule is typically referred to as a type of
Laffer curve. Den Haan (2007) and Rocheteau (1999) have shown, within a search-and-matching model,
that a balanced-budget rule can generate multiple long-run equilibria with different unemployment rates.
These authors use a different setup than ours and abstract from issues of centralization/coordination
in wage bargaining. Den Haan (2007) presents a model where unemployment benefits per unemployed
worker and other government expenditures are exogenously fixed. The income tax rate must then adjust
so that the balanced-budget rule holds. The author finds multiple steady-state unemployment rates if
government expenditures and unemployment benefits are high enough. In the framework of Rocheteau
(1999) unemployment benefits are financed by a lump-sum tax on production. This author shows that
equilibrium multiplicity is a generic property under a balanced-budget rule.
8This particular modeling of centralization is in concordance with the Swedish experience. In the
Swedish economy, LO was the central workers’ confederation in charge of negotiating for workers for more
than three decades. In LO’s web site one can read “LO is primarily an organization for coordination,
research and creating public opinion. Wage bargaining and labor market insurance schemes are some of
the areas for which LO is responsible for coordination. Affiliates of LO have independent status and are
responsible for the administration of the unemployment insurance funds.”
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Individual firms do not engage directly in wage negotiations, and then intra-firm bar-
gaining does not apply. Firms take wage rates as given when opening vacancies, which
renders the following first-order conditions,
[
Fnj − ωj
]
µj = a
′
j(vj) for j = s, u, (4.15)
Since our analysis abstracts from wage solidarity —both within and across unions—
and since workers are heterogeneous —both in terms of skills and of the matching outcome—
we envision two different ways of modeling the unions’ federation. The first one is to assume
that the encompassing unions’ federation is utilitarian, seeks to maximize the sum of all
workers’ net incomes and engages in a two-agent bargaining with the employers’ federa-
tion. Alternatively, we can model the unions’ federation as being made up of coalitions
of homogeneous workers, which engage in a multi-agent bargaining with the employers’
federation. Since the results do not depend on which model is adopted, in this section we
present the results using the latter.
The income value of having ns and nu workers employed at wages ωs and ωu for the
different coalitions of workers and for the employers’ federation are as follows. Within
the coalition of unions for type-j workers there are two homogeneous coalitions of sizes
Mj and xj −Mj (which in equilibrium are nj and xj − nj, respectively). Income values
for each worker within each of the coalitions are now presented. The value to a matched
worker in a union for type-j workers is,
Wj = ωj − τ(ωj − d). (4.16)
The value to an unmatched union worker of type j is,
Uj = (1− ψ)[Φ(ωj + ς)− τ(Φ(ωj + ς)− d)] + ψ[B − τ(B − d)]. (4.17)
The income value to the employers’ federation of employing ns and nu workers at wages
ωs and ωu, respectively, is
J = F (kst, keq, ns, nu)−
∑
j=s,u
ωjnj −
∑
i=st,eq
riki. (4.18)
The outside option to centralized bargaining, both for workers and the employers’
federation, is to return to the decentralized economy where firms open vacancies according
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to eq. (4.10) and engage in wage negotiations with individual unions as described in the
previous section. The value of this option to a worker in a type-j union is his expected
income under decentralization, which we denote by Ej, for j = s, u. When there are
multiple decentralized bargaining equilibria, expectations are taken using subjective pro-
babilities over those equilibria. Thus, in the event of two decentralized equilibria, Ej =
ηyeq1j + (1− η)yeq2j − κ, where η is the subjective probability placed on the occurrence of
equilibrium 1.9
The value to the employers’ federation is given by expected firms’ profits, which we
denote by J¯ . For simplicity it is assumed that both federations have the same subjective
probabilities on the occurrence of the two equilibria.
Wage rates in the centralized bargaining equilibrium are the solution to a Nash-
bargaining problem between the coalitions within type-s unions, coalitions within type-u
unions and the employers’ federation. The maximization problem is given by,10
max
{ωs,ωu}
 ∏
j=s,u
(Wj − Ej)nj(Uj − Ej)(xj−nj)
p (J − J¯)1−p, (4.19)
subject to the unemployment program’s budget constraint, equation (4.8), the first-order
condition to Φ, and Wj ≥ Ej, Uj ≥ Ej, J ≥ J¯ , for j = s, u.
Thus, by taking into account the two equations that determine policy variables, central-
ized bargaining internalizes the externalities stemming from the unemployment benefits
program.
Definition A centralized bargaining equilibrium (CBE) is a set of sequences for rental
prices of capitals, {rst, req}, wages {ωs, ωu}, employment levels, {ns, nu}, capital stocks
{kst,t, keq,t}, vacancies {vs, vu}, matching rates for vacancies {µs, µu}, matching rates for
workers {ms,mu}, the tax rate {τ} unemployment benefits {Φ}, and subjective probabi-
9It must be noted that if centralized negotiations fail, firms are not committed to their hiring policies
and will change the number of vacancies to affect the wage that will result from the subsequent decentral-
ized negotiations. For this reason, and in order to avoid complicating further the framework by introducing
probabilities of being matched in the first round but not hired, and probabilities of being matched and
hired in the second round, we assume that all workers must search again if centralized negotiations fail.
10Our modeling of negotiation between homogeneous coalitions follows Kalai (1977) by assuming that
each coalition member has right to talk. For an alternative modeling of negotiation between coalitions see,
for instance, Chae and Heidhues (2004).
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lities over the decentralized bargaining equilibria such that,
(i) Taking rental prices, wage and matching rates as given, {kst, keq}, and {vs, vu} solve
the firms’ maximization problem and nj = µjvj for j = s, u.
(ii) Taking tax rates and rental prices as given, {kst, keq} maximize capitalists’ lifetime
utility.
(iii) Wages are the Nash solution to a bargaining problem between the unions’ and em-
ployers’ federations with the stated subjective probabilities over the outcome of
decentralized bargaining.
(iv) Matching rates are given by the matching function, i.e., µj = Mj/vj, and mj =
Mj/xj for j = s, u.
(v) {Φ} solves the government’s maximization problem, and the budget constraint of
the unemployment benefit program holds.
(vi) Participation constraints are satisfied.
The decision of labor unions regarding whether to engage in centralized wage bargaining
or, on the contrary, to conduct uncoordinated decentralized bargaining can be thought of in
terms of a standard, infinitely repeated game, where labor unions observe the current state
of the economy before they choose their actions. If we narrow the analysis by assuming
Nash reversion or grim trigger strategies, and focus on pure strategy subgame perfect
equilibria, then the problem can be analyzed using standard results in the literature of
repeated games.11
For our problem at hand, we make the analysis even simpler. Since centrally bargained
wages are enforceable, we assume that no labor union can increase the instantaneous
income of the affiliated worker by deviating from cooperation within a given period. This
enforceability implies that the labor unions’ decision problem becomes a period-by-period
problem with no intertemporal links. Moreover, since we focus on only two instances of
11Holden and Oddbjorn (1991) present a model of wage setting where unions choose to cooperate or
not. In their model, if a union deviates the agreement breaks down and each union plays the one-shot
Nash strategy. They assume that after a break down in cooperation there is an exogenous probability
that cooperation is re-started.
22
wage bargaining (full centralization and full decentralization), a deviation by a single union
(and therefore of all unions of the same type) from centralization will cause decentralized
bargaining to hold. All this, added to the fact that there are no side payments within nor
across unions, simplifies the analysis of the model significantly, while retaining the trade-
offs we put forward in this paper for the rise and fall of centralized bargaining. Indeed, as
will be shown below, under certain conditions on technology, there are systems of subjective
probabilities over the outcome of decentralized bargaining for which centralization arises
endogenously as the equilibrium bargaining arrangement. Technical change will make
centralization unsustainable.
5 The Rise and Fall of Centralized Wage Bargaining
Under the production technology extant before the 80’s, a program of unemployment
benefits like the one outlined in the previous section sets the conditions for the rise of cen-
tralized wage bargaining. More specifically, we show in this section that when we calibrate
our model to match some key values of the Swedish economy in 1970, the externalities
from the program of unemployment benefits yield two expectational equilibria under de-
centralized wage bargaining. In one of these equilibria unemployment rates are high, and
capital accumulation and workers’ incomes are low. It is hence the existence of this bad
equilibrium, along with a positive subjective probability of its occurrence, that renders
centralization the prevailing wage-bargaining arrangement of the 1970 economy. In short,
centralization arises as a response to the existence of multiple expectational equilibria.
However, for the level of equipment-specific technology reached in the early 90’s the so-
cial welfare program no longer creates the threat of a bad expectational equilibrium, and,
consequently, centralized bargaining is no longer sustainable.
Parameterization We parameterize the matching process, M(vj, hj), as
Mj =
vjhj(
vρj + h
ρ
j
) 1
ρ
for j = s, u,
which is an increasing and constant-returns-to-scale function in the number of vacancies
and searchers. As explained by Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000) the main advantage
of this matching function, with respect to the standard Cobb-Douglas matching function,
is that matching probabilities lie between zero and one for all values of vj and hj.
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We parameterize the production technology and its evolution in the postwar period
assuming equipment-specific technological progress and equipment-skill complementarity.
According to Greenwood, Herkowitz and Krusell (1997), the growth in production per
capita experienced by the U.S. economy in the postwar period is, to a great extent, the
result of equipment-specific technological progress. Krusell, Ohanian, R´ıos-Rull and Vi-
olante (2000) [KORV henceforth] take this idea as a starting point and estimate an aggre-
gate production function for the U.S. economy. Their main result is that the elasticity of
substitution between equipment and high-skilled labor is lower than that between equip-
ment and low-skilled labor: there is equipment-skill complementarity. The same result is
found by Lindquist (2005) for the Swedish economy. In our model, this scenario can be
represented by increases in q, and by assuming equipment-skill complementarity in our
production function F .
The Krusell, Ohanian, Rı´os-Rull and Violante Production Function KORV
(2000) present a four-factor aggregate production function with capital equipment, capital
structures, high- and low-skilled labor which allows for different elasticities of substitution
among factors of production. In particular, they choose a Cobb-Douglas function over
structures and a CES function of equipment, high- and low-skilled labor. The production
function they estimate is,
F (kst, keq, ns, nu) = k
ϕ
st
[
θ
[
λkσeq + (1− λ)nσs
]α/σ
+ (1− θ)nαu
](1−ϕ)/α
. (5.1)
Lindquist (2005) estimates this production function for the 1967-1996 Swedish economy.
Parameters α and σ are of especial importance in our analysis since they determine key
elasticities of substitution. The estimates for these two parameters presented by both
KORV (2000) and Lindquist (2005) indicate that the elasticity of substitution between
equipment and low-skilled labor is higher than that between equipment and high-skilled
labor. That is, there is equipment-skill complementarity. In our notation this implies
α > σ.
Finally, vacancy cost functions are assumed to be quadratic in the number of vacancies,
i.e., aj(vj) = ajv
2
j , for j = s, u, where aj > 0 are parameters to be calibrated. These cost
functions are a particular case of the one used by Rotemberg (2006). This author uses
arguments of economies of scale to depart from a linear cost function.
Parameter values We now assign values to all parameters in the model, using both a pri-
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ori information and a number of observations for the Swedish economy to be matched. The
observations that will be matched correspond to 1970, a year in which centralized bargain-
ing was at its peak. Hence, in addition to matching selected economic variables, centralized
bargaining must be chosen by all unions as the prevailing wage-setting arrangement.12
Parameters set with a priori information are the following. The measure of high-
skilled workers, xs, is set at 0.05, which is the fraction of university graduates in the
labor force (see the labor force surveys, Statistics Sweden). The value of ψ is set at
0.2, which corresponds to an average eligibility for unemployment compensation of five
years. The parameters in the production function are taken from the estimates for the
Swedish economy by Lindquist (2005). In particular, σ = −0.9 and α = 0.3. The rate of
depreciation for equipment is set at 12.5%, which is the value used by Statistics Sweden
for constructing the stock of capital equipment for the Swedish economy [this is the same
rate found by Greenwood, Herkowitz and Krusell (1997) for the U.S. economy]. The rate
of depreciation for structures is set at 5%, which is the value reported by Lindquist (2005).
The value of ρ, the parameter in the matching function, is set at 1.26 as reported by Den
Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000)13. The level of technology in the equipment-goods sector
q is set at 0.8, so that the relative price of equipment over the relative price of structures
in 1970 is 1.25, as reported by Lindquist (2005). (Note that the relative price of structures
has been normalized to one.) Finally, the number of unions for high-skilled workers is
set at 22, which is the number of unions within the unions’ confederation for professional
workers, SACO. The number of unions for low-skilled workers is set at 19, which is the
number of unions within LO, the unions’ confederation for low-skilled labor.
The remaining ten parameters: κ, as, au, β, γ, p, B, d, ς, and the subjective probability
over decentralized equilibria, η, are selected so that the following observations are matched
12It should be noted that ours is not a standard calibration exercise where unknown parameter values
are obtained by solving a system of non-linear equations. Economic variables in the centralized equilib-
rium depend on workers’ pre-matching incomes in the decentralized equilibrium (or equilibria in case of
multiplicity). That is, for a given list of parameter values decentralized equilibria must be computed prior
to obtaining the centralized equilibrium. Consequently, we pin down unknown parameter values following
an ad hoc iterative process until the centralized equilibrium matches the targeted values. Due to this
procedure there might be small discrepancies between equilibrium and targeted values.
13By using the same matching technology as the one calibrated for the US economy we purposely leave
aside the possible effects of the wage-bargaining arrangement on the productivity of matching.
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by the centralized bargaining equilibrium. (i) An unemployment rate for the high-skilled of
0.6% (Statistics Sweden). (ii) An unemployment rate for the low-skilled of 2.7% (Statistics
Sweden). (iii) A labor’s share of income of 63%. (iv) A capital output ratio of 2.6. (v)
A skill premium, defined as the university-gymnasium log wage differential, of 0.6 [this is
the value for 1970 reported by Edin and Holmlund (1995), who use data from the Level
of Living Survey (LNU), and the Household Market and Non-market Activities Survey
(HUS)]. (vi) An equipment-to-structures ratio of 0.14 (Statistics Sweden). (vii) An average
benefit replacement rate (computed as net-of-tax benefit entitlements as a percentage of
net-of-tax earnings) of 84%. (viii) A differential in the replacement rate across skills of
ten percent points (Statistics Sweden). (ix) Unemployment benefits outlays amount to 1%
of GDP, as reported by the Swedish Unemployment Insurance Board (IAF). (x) Welfare
payments amount to about one fifth of total unemployment compensation (Labor Market
Board, Insurance Unit).
Table 4 below presents our benchmark economy.
TABLE 4—PARAMETER VALUES
Workers Capitalists Technology Matching Benefits
xs = 0.05 σ = −0.9 κ = 0.09 ψ = 0.2
xu = 0.95 β = 0.96 α = 0.3 as = 3× 10−3 ς = 0.1
p = 0.52 δst = 0.05 θ = 0.36 au = 2× 10−4 B = 0.28
Ns = 22 δeq = 0.125 λ = 0.48 ρ = 1.26 d = 0.1
Nu = 19 ϕ = 0.19 γ = −0.3
The Rise of Centralization
For these parameter values, a level of technology in the equipment sector equal to 0.8,
and a value of η of 0.9 (i.e., the subjective probability on the bad equilibrium under de-
centralization), the centralized bargaining equilibrium of our model economy matches the
observations for the 1970 Swedish economy listed above. To address the question of why
unions opted for centralized bargaining in 1970, we present in Table 5 below unemploy-
ment rates and expected pre-matching workers’ net incomes both under centralized and
decentralized bargaining. Several comments on our results are in order. First, the two
equilibria arising in the decentralized bargaining economy can be ranked in terms of pre-
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matching workers’ net incomes: the equilibrium with low unemployment rates, DBE1, is
associated with higher expected incomes. Second, the centralized bargaining equilibrium,
CBE, yields lower unemployment rates than under decentralization. In terms of expected
workers’ income, centralized bargaining yields income levels below those in DBE1, but
above income levels unions expect in DBE2. However, for the subjective probability on
the occurrence of DBE2 in our calibrated economy, expected incomes in the centralized
economy are higher than expected incomes under decentralization.
Therefore, centralized bargaining arises as the wage-setting arrangement in the 1970
economy. According to our theory labor unions for high-skilled workers embarked in
centralized bargaining along with the low-skilled during the 50’s, 60’s and 70’s because of
the threat posed by the possibility of coordination failures under decentralization, which
might otherwise have lessened workers income substantially.
TABLE 5—UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND WORKERS EXPECTED INCOMES UNDER DECENTRALIZED AND
CENTRALIZED BARGAINING
Decentralized Bargaining Centralized Bargaining
DBE1 DBE2 CBE
urs 0.74% 1.1% 0.6%
uru 3.1% 23.4% 2.7%
urtotal 3.0% 22% 2.6%
ys 0.7530 0.4689 0.5692
yu 0.3004 0.2729 0.2869
Note: Equilibrium values correspond to the economy with q = 0.8 and the parameter values
presented in Table 4. Note that ys and yu denote expected pre-matching net incomes of high-
and low-skilled union workers, respectively.
The multiplicity of equilibria under decentralized bargaining results from the fiscal ex-
ternalities created by the unemployment benefit program As mentioned above, this result
hinges on the fact that a generous system of public insurance may be a cause macroe-
conomic instability and thus lead to the creation of new institutions —centralized wage
bargaining— aimed at mitigating such instability. Complete unionization of the labor force
implies that under centralization fiscal spillovers are fully internalized. The robustness of
the multiplicity result with respect to the unemployment program’s parameter values is
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explored below.
The Fall of Centralization
The hypothesis advanced in this paper regarding the collapse of centralized wage bar-
gaining is the breakdown of the unions’ alliance. That is, individual labor unions found
that it was no longer in their interest to continue holding centralized wage negotiations.
We show in this Section that the change in the wage-bargaining arrangement can be ac-
counted for as the result of the two following trends observed in the Swedish economy
between 1970 and 1990: 1) An increase in the level of technology in the equipment sector.
According to estimates using relative prices of equipment, the average rate of equipment-
specific technological progress in the 1970-1990 period is around 3%. This implies an
increase in q from 0.8 to 1.25. 2) An increase in the relative supply of high-skilled labor.
The proportion of the Swedish workforce with a university degree increased from 5% in
1970 to 15% in 1990 [see Edin and Holmlund (1995)].
Hence, we modify our benchmark economy to update q and xs to their 1990 values,
and show that our model accounts for the collapse of centralized wage negotiations. The
results of this exercise are presented in Table 6 below. The decentralized equilibrium with
high unemployment rates that was operating as a threat to decentralization in 1970 no
longer exists in the 1990 economy. Equipment-specific technical progress renders equilib-
rium uniqueness under decentralized bargaining by increasing the productivity gap across
workers. For given government aversion to inequality and given progressivity of benefits
and taxes, the relative increase in the productivity of high-skilled labor leads to the viola-
tion of equilibrium conditions at the upper part of the Laffer curve.14 Therefore, workers’
outside values to centralized bargaining are given by net incomes at the unique equilib-
rium that would emerge under decentralization. In other words, subjective probabilities
on the outcome of holding decentralized negotiations are degenerate at equilibrium DBE1
in Table 6. For these outside values the bargaining set under centralization is empty.
That is, there is no pair of equilibrium wage rates that can yield all coalitions of workers
net incomes above their outside values. In short, according to our theory, equipment-
specific technological progress and the increase in the relative supply of high-skilled labor
14To gain further insight on how an increase in q contributes to the removal of equilibrium multiplicity,
we have prepared an on-line Appendix where we make a number of simplifying assumptions so that the
equilibrium can be found by solving a system of two equations in two unknowns.
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caused the end of centralization via the removal of the threat of coordination failures in
the decentralized economy.
TABLE 6—UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND WORKERS EXPECTED INCOMES UNDER DECENTRALIZED AND
CENTRALIZED BARGAINING
Decentralized Bargaining Centralized Bargaining
DBE1 DBE2 CBE
urs 2.5% – –
uru 2.0% – –
urtotal 2.0% – –
ys 0.4273 – –
yu 0.3275 – –
Note: Equilibrium values correspond to the economy with q = 1.25, xs = 0.15, xu = 0.85 and
parameter values presented in Table 4.
In addition to accounting for the collapse of centralization, our model’s predictions
are qualitatively in concordance with the patterns in unemployment and the skill pre-
mium observed in the Swedish economy between 1970 and the early 1990’s. Regarding
unemployment, the Swedish unemployment rate remained almost unchanged in the 80’s,
notwithstanding the sharp decline in centralization. The economy-wide unemployment
rate in 1990 was 2%, roughly the same rate as in 1970.15 Our model predicts the 2%
unemployment rate in 1990, and hence that moving from full centralization to decentral-
ization did not affect the unemployment rate in a significant manner. While our model
overpredicts the unemployment rate among high-skilled workers, it does predict the drop
in unemployment for low-skilled workers from 2.7% to about 2% in 1990.
Regarding the skill premium, the Swedish college-gymnasium wage differential declined
during the 70’s and the first half of the 80’s, and then increased during the second half
of the 80’s and the 90’s.16 By 1990 the Swedish skill premium was still more than 25%
lower than in 1970. Our model yields a skill premium in 1990 that is less than half
15The Swedish unemployment rate experienced, however, an abrupt increase in the second half of the
90’s, to rates in the order of 8− 9 percent.
16This pattern is qualitatively similar to the one observed in the US economy, which constitutes the
subject of study in KORV (2000). These authors explain the U-shaped time profile of the US skill premium
as the net result of two opposite effects: a relative quantity effect, and a capital-skill complementarity
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the value matched in 1970. In our model, this decline is the net result of three effects:
(i) the relative increase in high-skilled labor, a relative quantity effect; (ii) the relative
increase in equipment capital, a capital-skill complementarity effect; and (iii) the decline
in centralization, a wage-bargaining effect. The contribution of each of these effects to the
skill premium is as follows. First, the increase in q from 0.8 to 1.25, holding the fraction of
high-skilled workers fixed at 5%, increases the skill premium from 0.6 to 0.95. This is the
capital-skill complementary effect. Next, the increase in xs from 5% to 15%, holding the
value of q fixed at 0.8, decreases the skill premium from 0.6 to 0.17. This is the relative
quantity effect. The last effect, the wage bargaining effect, cannot be quantified in the
1990 economy, since the bargaining set is empty under centralized negotiations. If we use,
however, the centralized bargaining equilibrium and the “good” decentralized equilibrium
(EQ1) of the 1970 economy to proxy this effect in the 1990 economy, we find that the
bargaining effect amounts to an increase in the skill premium by 50%, that is, going from
centralization to decentralization, holding everything else constant, would increase the
skill premium from 0.6 to 0.9.
5.1 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to selected parameters.
We explore the effects of changes in the values of those parameters that play a prominent
role either in shaping the fiscal externalities under decentralized wage bargaining —and
thus in setting up the conditions for centralized bargaining— or in restoring equilibrium
uniqueness after the increase in technology. We start out with our benchmark economy
and then change the value of those key parameters. By so doing, we address two different
but related questions. First, how robust are our results to changes in parameter values?
Second, can we find patterns explaining the variation in the wage-setting arrangement
across countries? The results from this exercise may be summarized as: (i) our results are
fairly robust to parameter values; (ii) variation in parameter values that determine the
generosity and progressivity of unemployment benefits, γ, ψ and ς, and the progressivity
of taxation, d, have an unambiguous effect on multiplicity. The lower the generosity and
effect. The first effect —the relative increase in the high-skilled labor input— contributes to reduce the
skill premium. The second effect —the relative increase in capital equipment— contributes to increase
the skill premium under equipment-skill complementarity.
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progressivity of benefits, and the progressivity of taxation, the less likely the possibility of
multiple equilibria.
First we study the sensitivity of the multiplicity result with respect to parameters
defining the social program: the government’s attitude to inequality, γ; the eligibility to
unemployment benefits, ψ; the progressivity of benefits, ς; welfare payments B; and the
progressivity of taxation, d. We set values for these parameters so that the externali-
ties generated by the social program are just enough to yield multiple equilibria in the
decentralized economy. That is, further changes in those parameters in the direction of
weakening redistribution, progressivity and eligibility would result in a unique equilibrium
under decentralization. These values are: γ = 0.15, ς = 0.06, B = 0.19, d = 0.04 and
ψ = 0.33. These values define a program with progressivity in benefits less than three
percent points, and an average eligibility of about two thirds of our benchmark economy.
We have also explored how some of these parameters trade off in maintaining the multi-
plicity of equilibria. For instance, a decrease in the progressivity of benefits, ς, from its
benchmark value must be accompanied either by an increase in government’s aversion for
inequality (i.e., a decrease in γ) or by an increase in B to restore equilibrium multiplicity.
From this sensitivity exercise we conclude that the conditions for centralized wage bar-
gaining are directly related to the generosity and progressivity of the social program. We
use these results below to assess the cross-country differential in centralization scores.
The effects of changes in the production function’s parameter values are as follows.
The multiplicity of equilibria under decentralized bargaining is robust to changes in these
parameter values. However, the extent to which equipment-specific technical change can
restore equilibrium uniqueness —and thus cause the fall of centralization— depends on
the differential in the elasticities of substitution between equipment and the two types of
labor. That is, on the value of σ relative to α. Starting from our benchmark economy,
we solve the model for higher values of σ and find that for a value of this parameter as
high as −0.1 equipment-specific technical progress would still have caused the collapse of
centralization. Since Lindquist (2005) has shown that his estimate, σ = −0.9, is robust to
different model specifications, a value of the order of −0.1 can be considered far beyond
the range of estimated values for the Swedish economy.
Finally, one of the parameters we set using a priori information is the fraction of
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high-skilled workers in the labor force. Following related literature, we chose to define
a high-skilled worker as a university graduate. Then —and to be consistent with this
definition— we matched the skill premium using the university premium, and matched
the unemployment rate of high-skilled workers as that among university graduates. This
definition of high-skilled workers is not critical for our results. Our sensitivity analysis
with respect to xs and the magnitude of its increase between 1970 and 1990 shows that
our results are robust to the definition of high-skilled labor.
5.2 Cross-Country Differentials in Centralization Scores
In light of our model and the results above, we now turn our attention to wage bar-
gaining in non-Scandinavian countries. Rather than aiming at a full accounting and ex-
planation of bargaining institutions in those countries, we simply seek additional evidence
supporting the mechanism for the rise and fall of centralization outlined in this paper.
Thus, the type of question we address here is: can we, within the context of our model,
provide some rationale for the low and medium levels of centralization in wage bargaining
observed in non-Scandinavian economies?
According to Iversen’s (1999) index, Italy had one of the most decentralized wage-
bargaining arrangements among Western European economies. For the period 1973-79,
Iversen’s index averaged 0.1978; for the period 1980-1986, it was 0.1410, and 0.1587 for the
period 1987-1993. Italy’s low centralization compares to that of the US, and is in sharp
contrast to most of its neighboring countries, where centralization scores in the seven-
ties were in the order of 0.3-0.35. According to the theory developed in this paper, Italy’s
decentralization may be understood as a consequence of its lack of a proper program of un-
employment benefits.17 Labor market policy in Italy has been stubbornly directed toward
employment protection, leading to high firing restrictions and high severance payments.
17From the mid 40’s to the mid 80’s, unemployment benefits in Italy were essentially provided by the
so-called cassa di integrazione. Benefits had a maximum duration of 13 weeks, and were non-universal, as
they were granted only to workers employed in firms satisfying certain special conditions. The program
was mainly designed to assist workers in firms engaged in the restructuring of their activities, or in
firms affected by temporary productivity shocks non-attributable to the workers or the firms themselves.
Workers receiving benefits were only temporarily fired, and remained on hold until the firm resumed
activities.
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We argue that by turning away from a policy of unemployment benefits, Italy did not nur-
ture the fiscal externalities that lie at the heart of centralized wage bargaining. A similar
argument can be used to account for the highly decentralized wage-setting process in the
US economy. With low benefit replacement rates, short benefit duration, and stringent
eligibility conditions, the US unemployment benefit program seems to have fallen short of
generating large enough externalities, which set the conditions for centralized bargaining.
In contrast to the Italian and US cases, we cannot resort to the absence of fiscal
externalitites to rationalize the medium levels of centralization observed in many European
countries in the early 1970’s (e.g., Austria, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands and the UK).
Although the generosity and progressivity of benefit programs in these countries did not
reach the marks of the Swedish’s, all these countries had fairly developed programs to
assist the unemployed. Indeed, with the exception of the Netherlands where benefits were
as generous as in Sweden, replacement rates in most of the other countries were only
around 15 − 20 percent lower than in Scandinavian economies [see e.g., Martin (1996)].
Yet a more substantial difference between Scandinavian and non-Scandinavian benefit
programs is the way they are handled. As we pointed out above, in non-Scandinavian
countries benefit programs are compulsory, and do not call for worker affiliation with labor
unions. Hence, unionization rates in these countries have remained in the range of 30%
to 50%. We argue that incomplete unionization may help explain why in these economies
centralization did not attain Scandinavian standards. The implications of incomplete
unionization for the extent of centralization in wage bargaining are the following. First,
if non-unionized workers conduct their own wage negotiations, centralization scores are
necessarily lower, even if unions choose to coordinate wage bargaining. Further, the union
federation will be unable to fully internalize the fiscal externalities stemming from the
wage-setting process. Second, in the case in which wages bargained by the union federation
are extended to non-unionized workers, centralization will not reach maximum scores
either. On the one hand, federation-bargained wages are less enforceable, as the federation
in this case typically bargains a floor wage, and then allows full wage drift. On the
other hand, union concentration is also significantly lower. Since Iversen’s index includes
measures of enforceability and union concentration, the medium levels of centralization
in the above-mentioned countries may be explained by their relatively lower unionization
rates. In sum, a generous and progressive program of unemployment benefits is a necessary,
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but not sufficient, condition for maximum centralization scores.
6 Conclusions
We have analyzed a model of wage bargaining that explains the evolution of the wage-
setting process in Scandinavian economies. Our model is built upon the standard matching
model, extended to include heterogeneity among workers, and both fiscal and technolog-
ical links among these heterogeneous workers. Fiscal links in our model are created by a
generous and progressive unemployment benefit program, which is funded by the govern-
ment and administered directly by labor unions. Equipment-skill technical progress, along
with equipment-skill complementarity, shape the evolution of the productivity gap across
workers. Our analysis shows that when capital equipment is expensive and scarce, and,
therefore, high- and low-skilled workers are relatively alike, the externalities stemming
from the program of unemployment benefits can create coordination failures. Since co-
ordination failures yield substantial losses in unions’ income, centralized wage bargaining
may arise as an equilibrium, thus explaining why Scandinavian countries held centralized
wage negotiations until the early 80’s. With the advent of technological progress, which
increased the relative productivity of high-skilled workers, the possibility of coordination
failures vanished. Thus, labor unions regained their role as individual wage negotiators.
Our modeling of technological progress follows recent contributions, which have uncovered
the nature of technological progress during the postwar period. A calibrated version of
our model that takes into account the increase in technology successfully explains the rise
and fall of centralization in wage bargaining.
Several important implications emerge from our results. A first implication relates to
how the collapse of centralization should be assessed. Our theory shows that the collapse
of centralization must be seen as the unions’ response to technological progress, i.e., as
a way of accommodating the bargaining arrangement to the new production technology.
Accordingly, the fall of centralization might not be attributed to a shift in monetary
policy or to a mismanagement of centralized bargaining agreements. This stands in sharp
contrast to previous theories which place monetary policy at the center stage of the collapse
of centralization and which seem to suggest a whole re-assessment of monetary policy in
Europe.
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A second implication concerns the design of the unemployment benefit program, and
its ability to bring into existence other labor market institutions. Highly generous and pro-
gressive benefit programs with government funding are bound to create fiscal externalities
among labor unions. Under full unionization those externalities may end up triggering
highly centralized wage-setting arrangements. This is an important consequence of the
unemployment benefit program that has passed unnoticed in the literature. Our results
thus introduce some new arguments which should not be dismissed in the debate on un-
employment policy reform.
Our model can be extended along several directions. We have assumed that either all
unions belong to the federation, or there is no federation, i.e., we have narrowed down
the analysis to full centralization or full decentralization. It seems natural, however, to
think of situations in which only a fraction of unions belong to the federation. Even
though allowing for partial centralization will not change our conclusions, it will certainly
give rise to new questions, and will shed further light on wage-bargaining institutions in
non-Scandinavian economies. A second extension that can also open new avenues to the
study of related problems is the consideration of inter-union solidarity arguments. As we
pointed out above, our explanation for the rise and fall of centralization has intentionally
abstracted from such issues. Our aim was to show that the extent of centralization in
wage bargaining does not hinge on the extent of inter-union solidarity. Finally, our results
suggest a number of testable propositions regarding wage-setting arrangements and social
welfare programs. Empirical work along the lines set by our model will not only help
confront our theory with the data, but will also bring new insights for future research.
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